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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3479 
 ___________ 
 




CITY OF PHILADELPHIA 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-03880) 
 District Judge: Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 6, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 






 Jason Collura appeals from a judgment entered in favor of the City of Philadelphia 
(the City) following a non-jury civil trial in the United States District Court for the 





 Collura first filed suit, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City in February 2008 
(Civil Action 08-746), claiming that the Free Library of Philadelphia‟s Independence 
Branch maintained an unconstitutional policy of reserving certain tables at certain times 
for library patrons of East Asian ancestry.  “Mr. Collura and the City ultimately agreed to 
a dismissal of the lawsuit in return for the entry of a consent order that the Free Library of 
Philadelphia may not prohibit any individual, at any time, from sitting at or utilizing any 
table or seating arrangement because of that individual‟s race or ethnicity.”  DC Mem. 
Op., dkt #42, pg. 1 n.1.
1
  After Collura initiated Civil Action 08-746, Jennifer Chang, the 
manager of Independence Branch, learned that Collura had a prior criminal conviction for 
terroristic threats.  On April 10, 2008, Chang drafted an internal memo stating that 
Collura should no longer be allowed access to Independence Branch. 
 In the morning hours of April 25, 2008, Collura bumped into Corey Dorsey, the 
municipal security guard at Independence Branch, on his way into the library.  “Mr. 
Dorsey was aware of Mr. Collura‟s lawsuit and M[s]. Chang‟s April 10 memo before this 
incident.”  Id. at pg. 4.  The bumping incident was reported to the police, and later that 
day Collura‟s visiting privileges at Independence Branch were officially suspended for six 
                                                 
 
1
  Because a complete appendix was not prepared in this case, we will specifically 
refer to documents in the District Court record as needed. 
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months.  The reasons given in the suspension notice were as follows: (1) “Staring at 
patrons using a computer”; (2) “Staring at staff”; and (3) “Pushing and striking the 
Municipal Guard upon entering the library.”  Pl.‟s Comp., dkt #3, Ex. A.   
 In August 2008, Collura again sued the City under § 1983, alleging that his 
expulsion from the Independence Branch was effectuated in retaliation for his filing and 
prosecution of Civil Action 08-746—activity protected by the First Amendment.  Collura 
requested declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a public apology.  The City filed its 
answer, and the parties engaged in discovery and unsuccessful settlement negotiations.  
Judge McLaughlin conducted a bench trial on September 10, 2009, after which 
supplemental briefing was ordered on the issue of municipal liability.  
 By order entered August 9, 2010, the District Court directed that judgment be 
entered in favor of the City of Philadelphia, despite “serious concerns that the library 
employees took action against the plaintiff at least in part because of [Civil Action 08-
746].”  DC Mem. Op., dkt #42, pg. 7.  In reaching its verdict, the District Court 
specifically ruled that a § 1983 claimant seeking only prospective, non-monetary relief 
against a municipal entity is subject to the requirements of Monell v. Dep‟t of Social 
Servs. New York City, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); in other words, such a claimant must show 
that his alleged constitutional injury “was the result of municipal custom, policy, or 
practice.”  Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Comm., 555 U.S. 246, --- , 129 S. Ct. 788, 797 
(2009).  The District Court ruled that Collura had not shown by a preponderance of the 
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evidence that the Independence Branch employees‟ conduct, “whether retaliatory or not, 
was pursuant to a custom or practice of the City.”  DC Mem. Op., dkt #42, pg. 7.  Collura 
timely appealed.   
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “To the extent that the issues on 
appeal involve questions of law, we exercise de novo review.  To the extent that the 
District Court made findings of fact, we review them for clear error.”  Bear Mountain 
Orchards, Inc. v. Mich-Kim, Inc., 623 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation 
omitted).     
III. 
 The parties disagree whether the District Court erred in applying Monell to 
Collura‟s suit for prospective, non-monetary relief.  We have not squarely addressed this 
issue in a precedential opinion, but the Supreme Court has now spoken definitively and 
unanimously: “We conclude that Monell‟s holding applies to § 1983 claims against 
municipalities for prospective relief as well as to claims for damages.”  Los Angeles 
County, Cal. v. Humphries, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 447, 451 (2010).
2
  This was hardly 
groundbreaking news, for “as Monell explicitly stated, „[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can 
be sued directly under §1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the 
action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes‟ a policy or custom.”  
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Id. at 452 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690) (emphasis in original).   
 Given that Monell is applicable, we perceive no legal error in the District Court‟s 
conclusion that Collura failed to produce any evidence, let alone a preponderance of 
evidence, showing that his visiting privileges at Independence Branch were suspended 
pursuant to a City or Free Library policy or custom of doing so when a patron threatens or 
initiates civil litigation.  See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (explaining that a government „policy‟ can be established “when a 
„decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to 
the action‟ issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict,” and that “[a] course of 
conduct is considered to be a „custom‟ when, though not authorized by law, „such 
practices of state officials [are] so permanent and well settled‟ as to virtually constitute 
law.” ) (internal citations omitted).  In particular, there was no evidence showing that 
Chang was a “policymaker” under Pennsylvania law.  Id. at 1481.  
 Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.  Collura‟s motion 
 to exceed Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(ii)‟s type-volume limitation is granted.3 
                                                                                                                                                             
 2 
 This appeal was stayed on October 29, 2010, pending the ruling in Humphries.  
 
3
  Collura attempts to raise a host of claims in his brief—including claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, and the Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process 
Clause—that were merely mentioned in passing in the complaint and were not argued 
before the District Court at trial.  It is well established that, absent compelling or 
exceptional circumstances, this Court generally refuses to consider an argument or issue 
that a party has failed to raise in the District Court.  See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy‟s, Inc., 
354 F.3d 228, 233 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003).  We follow that practice here. 
